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Can Cross-Border Bargaining Coordination
Work? Analytical Reflections and Evidence
from the Metal Industry in Germany and
Austria
ABSTRACT ■ To contain downward pressures on labour standards, Europe’s
unions have attempted to coordinate their bargaining strategies. Little is
known about whether such coordination can actually work. Analytical
accounts have deduced its feasibility from national experiences with 
decentralized forms of coordination, while empirically only anecdotal 
evidence on its effectiveness is available. This article contributes to the 
analytical debate by pointing out the different logics of national and 
transnational bargaining coordination. Empirically, it tests the prospects for
cross-border coordination by analyzing how Austrian collective agreements
in the metal industry related to their German counterparts from 1969 to 2003.
We conclude by discussing the implications for EU-level bargaining 
coordination.
KEYWORDS: collective bargaining ■ European monetary union
■ Europeanization ■ pattern bargaining ■ transnational bargaining coordination
Introduction
Economic internationalization has brought transnational issues of indus-
trial relations to the forefront of research (Hyman, 1999). Europe
has attracted special attention, as it combines the single market with
nationally fragmented industrial relations. This profound asymmetry
threatens downward pressures on both material labour standards and
institutions of joint regulation (Streeck, 1992, 1993) because capital,
based on its superior cross-border mobility, can embark on a strategy of
‘regime shopping’, relocating production to what is seen as the most
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favourable labour market regime. This may unleash a ‘race to the bottom’
with regard to national regimes, at the same time creating a barrier to the
formation of a European industrial relations system.
Downward pressures on material standards are evident from the long-
term decline in the adjusted wage ratio (i.e. the share of wages and salaries
in national income) (Schulten, 2002). However, this contrasts with the
resilience of regulatory systems, such that institutional diversity across
countries still characterizes industrial relations (Ferner and Hyman,
1998; Traxler et al., 2001). Furthermore, comparative studies are incon-
clusive on whether a statistically significant tendency of regime shopping
exists (Cooke, 1997; Cooke and Noble, 1998; Erickson and Kuruvalla,
1994; Traxler and Woitech, 2000).
Discussions on whether a European system of industrial relations is in
the making have delivered highly controversial results, but it is clear that
institution-building is still lagging behind economic integration (Keller,
2005). Moreover, there is good reason to be sceptical about the ability of
Euro-corporatist institutions to prevent undercutting labour standards.
Neither the European social dialogue nor European works councils pos-
sess this ability, because a core area of employment regulation is beyond
their formal reach: that is, wages. In comparison, the unions’ initiatives to
coordinate their bargaining strategies across countries seem to be a more
promising alternative (Sisson and Marginson, 2002; Traxler, 1996). It has
become a multi-level and multi-faceted phenomenon, involving ‘top-
down’ activities by the ETUC and its European Industry Federations as
well as regionally limited, ‘bottom-up’ cooperation between national
unions in neighbouring countries (Dufresne and Mermet, 2002; Gollbach
and Schulten, 2000; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). Despite their manifold
differences in formal status, coverage, and coordination principles, these
initiatives share two important commonalities: their focal level of action
is the sector, and they rely on ‘soft’ coordination mechanisms. Hence
problems arise from their decentralized and voluntaristic character:
achieving consensus on coordination principles, assuring commitment to
and engagement with the coordination process, comparing qualitatively
differing bargaining outcomes, harmonizing diverse statistical data and
synchronizing bargaining systems which are disparate in terms of the
timing, level and scope of action.
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these arrangements is sparse.
Following its 2000 resolution on bargaining coordination, the ETUC
collects annual data comparing national wage movements to its guideline
of inflation plus a share in productivity growth. As a first study for 2000
and 2001 reveals (Dufresne and Mermet, 2002), different data sets used
for this evaluation yield contradictory results for several countries. When
controlling for these ambiguous cases, it turns out that four of the nine
remaining countries managed to observe the guideline. The European
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Metalworker’s Federation (EMF) also regularly monitors compliance of
its members with its coordination rule, and has registered deviations
from the rule in every year (EMF, 2002, 2005). Reflecting the manifold
problems of comparing bargaining outcomes across countries, it inter-
prets its coordination rule as a ‘political’ rather than a ‘mathematical’
concept (EMF, 2001: 3) and regards the coordination process as a polit-
ical success ‘in a wider perspective’, since it has established ‘a moral
claim, that no negotiation is a national issue alone’ (EMF, 2002: 25–6).
This corresponds with other findings on union bargaining strategies in
the metalworking sectors of France, Germany and Italy between 1999
and 2003 (Erne, 2004): bargainers generally take account of the rule, but
fail to meet it when employers and governments put strong pressure
upon them. Since strategies for cross-border coordination are a recent
phenomenon and current reviews are incomplete in country coverage,
such findings on their effectiveness are only tentative, and insufficient
for inferring conclusions on their structural (long-term) coordination
capacity. However, it is their structural capacity for coordination which
is primarily at issue, in line with union aspirations.
Since there is no reliable way to examine directly the long-term
effectiveness of the European networks of cross-border coordination,
one has to adopt an indirect research strategy, designed to test the key
precondition for their effectiveness: the feasibility of cross-border coor-
dination in a decentralized, voluntaristic context of full autonomy of the
national bargainers. Our basic assumption is that such a context requires
a non-hierarchical approach to coordination. As will be outlined in
greater detail later, this leaves pattern bargaining as the prime mover of
transnational coordination. We examine this assumption by analysing
how German and Austrian collective agreements in the metal industry
related to each other from 1969 to 2003. Our first section discusses
how a decentralized approach to transnational coordination by pattern
bargaining logically differs from its national counterpart. We then
explain the analytical relevance of a comparison of Austria and Germany,
and outline the economic and institutional background of the two coun-
tries. The next section presents the hypotheses, the model specification
for the statistical tests, and the findings. We conclude by pointing out
the implications these findings have for the potential of European-level
bargaining coordination.
Comparing the Logics of National and Transnational
Pattern Bargaining
The proposition that a decentralized setting can bring about effective
bargaining coordination across countries derives its plausibility from
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experience with decentralized coordination within countries. The para-
digm case is pattern bargaining, in the course of which a key bargaining
unit sets the pace for wage movements in other areas of the economy.
Comparative analysis has shown that pattern bargaining, led by the metal
industry, is a highly effective mechanism to synchronize pay increases
across the economy with inflation and employment targets (Traxler et al.,
2001). Note that this finding refers to long-term performance, since insti-
tutions can systematically influence economic performance only in the
long run. Effective coordination by pattern bargaining thus implies that
the metal industry must lead the overall bargaining process on a general-
ized and reiterated basis. This is the case in Austria, Germany and Japan.
Following these national experiences, observers regard pattern bargaining
involving a limited group of countries with Germany as the ‘anchor’, and
the metal industry as the core sector, as the most feasible form of EU-level
coordination (Sisson and Marginson, 2002; Traxler, 2002).
However, coordination within countries is certainly distinct from
coordination across countries (see Table 1). The basic difference is that
national pattern bargaining is usually geared to coordination of bargain-
ing across the distinct sectors of a country’s economy, whereas the
European bargaining networks each aim to orchestrate bargaining with-
in one sector across the countries of Europe. Therefore we first consider
the features of pattern bargaining in the national context and then discuss
their applicability to cross-border coordination.
Pattern bargaining rests on a certain configuration of interests and
power. The role of a pattern-setter appeals to metal industry bargainers
as a means of preventing other sectors from agreeing higher wage settle-
ments than their own. This interest arises from the sector’s exposure to
international competition, making it difficult to pass on wage increases
through higher prices. In contrast, more sheltered sectors are able to
externalize pay rises, in turn increasing prices for inputs used by the
exposed sectors. Other exposed sectors will be ready to follow the metal
industry, since their interests converge. This does not hold true for the
sheltered sectors, hence their compliance with pattern bargaining
depends on supportive power relations and economic conditions (Traxler
et al., 2001). Organized industrial relations are traditionally more devel-
oped in the metal industry than in most other sectors, as data on collect-
ive bargaining coverage and associational density indicate (Ebbinghaus
and Visser, 2000; Traxler, 1994). Weaker unions in other sectors will be
happy to have the agreements for the metal industry as a reference for
their own negotiations. The very high degree of inter-industry penetra-
tion which characterizes the metal industry helps its wage settlements
spill over to other sectors. A conservative monetary regime is another
condition supporting coordination by pattern bargaining, since tightening
monetary policy in response to ‘excessive’ wage increases also negatively
affects the sheltered sectors. The upshot of these considerations is that
cross-sectoral national pattern bargaining paves the way to wage moder-
ation across the economy.
This profile of cross-sectoral national pattern bargaining differs from its
sector-related transnational counterpart in several respects. There is a dif-
ference in goals: while cross-sectoral national pattern bargaining is directed
to long-term wage moderation, cross-border coordination along sector-
specific lines aims to combat ‘social dumping’. Furthermore, all the sup-
portive factors behind national pattern bargaining, which ensue from the
special position of the metal industry in relation to the other sectors, can-
not work in the case of sector-specific cross-border coordination. Most
importantly, the configuration of interests differs. The interrelationships
between the bargaining units whose strategies require coordination are far
less competitive in the national context than in the transnational case,
where companies in the distinct bargaining units operate in the same
market, so that their products are highly substitutable for each other.
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TABLE 1. The Distinct Logics of National and Transnational Coordination by
Pattern Bargaining
Dimension National Pattern Bargaining Transnational Pattern 
Bargaining
Scope of coordination Cross-sectoral within a Sector-level across 
country countries
Economic background Low inter-industry High intra-industry 
substitutability of products substitutability of 
and limited competition products, leading to 
between bargaining units strong competition 
in distinct sectors; core between bargaining 
position of metal industry units from distinct 
in the national economy countries
Coordination goal Wage moderation across Containing competitive 
sectors for the sake of downward pressures 
international competitiveness on labour standards
Interest configuration
Pattern-setter Metal industry seeks to Large countries 
prevent sheltered sectors especially vulnerable 
from externalizing to downward com-
inflationary wage increases petitive bargaining
Pattern takers Weak unions can benefit from Small countries may 
wage-push effect; employers free ride to a limited 
can prevent strong unions extent at the costs of 
from breakthroughs large countries
It follows that virtually none of the factors favourable to national pat-
tern bargaining holds for its cross-border version. The only exception is
monetary policy. Generally, the need for cross-border inter-union coor-
dination increases with declining national economic policy autonomy
(Ulman, 1975). EMU has strongly reduced this autonomy, and its foun-
dation on monetary conservatism exacerbates downward pressures on
labour standards: it deprives the member states of traditional policy
options to adjust to economic imbalances, leaving the labour market as
the main shock absorber. Since neither fiscal nor monetary policy is avail-
able to cushion these imbalances, labour markets in general and wage
bargaining in particular are especially exposed to the disciplining forces
of international competition.
EMU was thus the decisive impetus for unions to initiate EU-level
coordination (Gollbach and Schulten, 2000). However, while EMU gen-
erates the need for coordination it does not guarantee its fulfilment; this
requires a supportive configuration of interests. Put more specifically,
such coordination cannot work without pattern-setters. Collective action
theory suggests that these can be found in large countries, because they
are more vulnerable to competitive bargaining and thus more interested
in cross-border cooperation than their small counterparts. Given the
higher foreign trade dependence of small countries, their benefits from
competitive wage restraint in terms of enhanced international competi-
tiveness exceed the costs caused by a decline in domestic demand. The
reverse cost–benefit ratio applies to large countries, since foreign trade
accounts for a smaller share in the economy. It is thus no coincidence that
Germany, by far the biggest economy of Europe, is also the centre of
gravity for ‘inter-regional’ initiatives for cross-border bargaining net-
works. Conversely, there is no special interest for small countries in
cooperation; it is rational for them to ‘free ride’. Therefore, the pre-
sumptive pattern-setter must offer them an incentive to cooperate by
bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of cooperation. This means
that the pattern-setter has to tolerate that smaller countries orient their
bargaining strategy in a way that keeps their own pay increases slightly
lower than its own. This is what Olson (1965: 35) calls ‘the “exploitation”
of the great by the small’. Differences in national wage levels can also be
subsumed under this reasoning. As low-wage countries are less in-
terested in transnational bargaining coordination than high-wage -
countries, the former can be treated as ‘small’ actors in this context. This
confines the group of prospective pattern-setters to large, high-wage
countries.
One can infer from this that there are two essential preconditions for
sector-specific cross-border coordination: i) unions will be drawn into
coordination initiatives if their countries are subject to a common regime
of monetary conservatism; ii) the initiative must include a country which
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is so large that its unions are able and willing to take on the role of the
pattern-setter.
Research Design: Comparing Austria and Germany
To examine the above assumptions empirically, one has to compare one
large country with one or more small countries subject to a common,
conservative monetary regime over a long time period. The wage level of
the large country should be higher than that of the small country. Among
the large countries, Germany is the only candidate for this analysis.
From the 1980s onwards, one European country after another surren-
dered to the hegemony of the Bundesbank and tied its exchange rate to
the Deutschmark (DM), leading to de facto monetary union with
Germany. We include Austria as a small country in this analysis, since it
was the first country (in 1981) to peg its currency explicitly to the DM.
Before that time, its exchange rate policy had been oriented towards a
‘basket’ composed of the currencies of its main low-inflation trading
partners (Tichy, 1997). This had entailed noticeable deviations from the
German exchange rate policy on several occasions during the 1970s,
although both countries had pursued a stability-oriented ‘hard currency
policy’. In addition, wage levels have been higher in Germany than in
Austria. For instance, in 2000 labour costs per hour in manufacturing
were €26.34 in Germany and €23.60 in Austria, according to Eurostat.
We compare the two countries with regard to bargaining outcomes in
the metal industry which, as already noted, operates as the national
pattern-setter in both Austria and Germany as well as the pace-setter
at EU level. This analysis covers the bargaining rounds from 1969/1970
to 2003/2004. Hence we can differentiate between two relatively long
sub-periods according to the relationship between the currencies of the
two countries. As will be delineated in greater detail below, both coun-
tries formed part of cross-border networks in the metal industry over the
entire period under examination, with variations in formal status, func-
tion and territorial coverage over time.
A brief summary of the institutional context will help understand and
interpret the following quantitative analysis. We will first address the
national level and then turn to the supranational.
The Austrian and German systems of collective bargaining have mani-
fold similarities. Most essentially, industry-level multi-employer bar-
gaining, backed by strong employers’ associations and unions and by a
statutory peace obligation during the validity of agreements, prevails in
both countries. In both countries, the metal industry sets the pattern for
bargaining in the other sectors. Separate bargaining for (large-scale)
industry and (small-scale) craft production is also common practice.
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Likewise, there is one principal bargainer for labour: IG Metall (IGM) in
Germany, and Gewerkschaft Metall-Textil-Nahrung (Union of Metal,
Textiles and Food Industries, GMTN) in Austria.
Both systems of labour law provide a dual structure of labour repre-
sentation, consisting of unions and works councils. While they are for-
mally independent, widespread unionization of works councils has
resulted in a high degree of incorporation into the union organization.
Labour law in both countries has established a clear division of labour
between unions and works councils, giving priority to the former in all
matters of collective bargaining. Most importantly, Austrian and German
works councils are not entitled to negotiate wage increases with manage-
ment, unless authorized to do so by multi-employer agreements. This
has become increasingly common in both countries, as multi-employer
bargaining has undergone a process of ‘organized’ decentralization,
beginning with agreements on flexible working time from the mid-1980s
onwards, followed by provisions for flexible wages since the 1990s.
However, it is important to note that the rationale behind decentralized
wage bargaining differs. In Germany the collective agreements contain
exit clauses, authorizing management and works council to undercut the
standard rate under certain circumstances. In Austria employers have to
pay extra for more flexible wages according to the ‘distribution option’,
as occasionally laid down by multi-employer agreements.
This brings us to the differences between the two countries, which
may affect the capacity for cross-border coordination. The timing of the
bargaining rounds is completely different: in Germany there is volatility,
as the validity of agreements varies between bargaining rounds, usually
from one to two years. In Austria bargaining was similarly volatile until
the late 1970s, but has since been strictly standardized in annual rounds.
Since then, negotiations about new agreements have always been opened
in autumn. As a consequence, the countries’ bargaining rounds became
asynchronous. The Austrian collective agreement is concluded roughly
six months after the preceding German pilot settlement.
The purview of the industry agreements also differs in branches, terri-
tory, and the type of employees covered. Austrian agreements cover
not only metal-working but also such branches as mining, iron and steel
production and the manufacture of gas, steam and hot-water equipment,
all of which are outside the German metal-working agreements. In con-
trast to Germany, however, since 2001 the Austrian agreement has not
included the electrical and electronics sector. In territorial respects, the
Austrian agreements cover the whole country, whereas agreements are
concluded separately for the distinct bargaining districts in Germany –
though collective bargaining for the German metal industry is in fact
highly coordinated, since a ‘pilot agreement’ in one region is copied by
the other districts.
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Bargaining is still formally differentiated by employee status in
Austria, because GMTN organizes only blue-collar workers, while the
Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten (Union of Salaried Private Sector
Employees, GPA) represents white-collar employment, and separate
agreements are signed by each union. This differentiation has lost
importance since the early 1990s, when the two unions started to negotiate
wage agreements jointly, resulting in fairly similar outcomes for the two
groups, and recent agreements have harmonized their employment
terms. In Germany, differentiation by employee status has never been
important and has disappeared completely since the former independent
union of white-collar employees joined the merger which created ver.di.
The structure of employer organization also differs. What the metal
industry agreements embrace in Germany is covered by one single
employer association, Gesamtmetall. In Austria a bargaining cartel of
several sub-units of the Chamber of Business, WKÖ, negotiate the
industry agreement jointly on behalf of the employers. WKÖ member-
ship is compulsory, hence employer density and collective bargaining
coverage are 100 percent. Finally, the bargaining climate is more adver-
sarial in Germany than in Austria. As well as warning strikes that often
accompany negotiations, the German metal industry regularly sees major
disputes. In Austria the last sector-wide strike occurred in 1962, and
there has never been a lockout.
The metal industry unions have a long tradition of cross-border
networking. Aside from the International Metalworkers Federation
(IMF), the oldest arrangement that bands the unions of Austria and
Germany together is the DACH network: the title stands for the abbre-
viations of the three participating countries, Germany, Austria and
Switzerland, but also means literally ‘roof’ and figuratively ‘umbrella’.
DACH existed before the 1970s, but none of the participating unions
knows the year of its foundation. This reflects its informal character:
union representatives of the three countries meet once a year to exchange
information and views, without any ambition to arrive at common deci-
sions. DACH is concerned with bargaining matters but has not been
limited to them. Union representatives report that the network has con-
tributed to mutual understanding of the country-specific problems and
practices of bargaining.
As a platform to discuss bargaining issues, DACH has receded in sig-
nificance in parallel with growing weight of EMF as an umbrella of
not only EU member states but also other European countries, and as a
vanguard of cross-border bargaining coordination. GMTN joined EMF
no earlier than in the late 1980s. Meanwhile, one of the seven regions into
which the EMF Steering Committee is differentiated consists of Austria,
Germany, and Switzerland. Under these circumstances, DACH now-
adays works as a mechanism to concert and advance common interests
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within EMF and IMF. Attempts at explicit coordination that includes
Germany and Austria have gathered momentum with the 1993 EMF
statement on bargaining principles, formulated in response to the
approach of EMU. Accordingly, the unions should orient their bargain-
ing goals towards inflation, productivity and a redistributive component
(Gollbach and Schulten, 2000). In 1998 these principles were confirmed
and translated into a ‘coordination rule’, identifying inflation and a ‘bal-
anced participation’ in productivity growth as the key reference for
national bargainers. While this rule is not enforceable, EMF has made
considerable efforts to set up the institutional preconditions for effective
coordination. This includes a comprehensive information system,
designed to prepare bargaining and monitor outcomes. To assure compar-
ability across countries, the national unions are expected to inform about
the estimated value of their whole agreement, taking both quantitative
and qualitative components of the agreement into consideration.
Coordination by EMF is complemented by ‘inter-regional’ bargaining
networks comprising neighbouring countries. The Wiener Memorandum
of 1999 brought together IGM Bavaria, GMTN, and their counterparts
from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary. Aside from
special seminars and conferences organized within this framework, the
union leaders and the members of the working group each meet once a
year to exchange information on economic trends, and to discuss their
bargaining policy in the light of the EMF coordination rule as well as
other bilateral issues, such as outsourcing and relocation of companies.
Further bilateral cooperation between these neighbouring countries
takes place at sub-regional level.
Hypotheses, Model Specifications and Empirical Findings
The above analytical assumptions, together with basic information on the
two countries, enable us to refine our hypotheses on the preconditions
and effectiveness of cross-border bargaining coordination:
1) There will be no significant interaction between the bargaining out-
comes in the two countries during the period of national monetary
autonomy (from 1969/70 to 1979/80 in terms of bargaining rounds),
since differences in exchange rate policy give rise to differing leeway
for collective bargaining.
2) For the period of monetary union (from 1980/81 to 2002/03), there
will be a statistically significant, positive correlation between the bar-
gaining outcomes in the two countries.
3) Since large countries as the pace-setters must bear the main burden
of coordination, wage increases in Austria are expected to be slightly
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(i.e. not significantly) below those in Germany during the period of
monetary union.
Our hypotheses mean that economic conditions, as given by the mon-
etary regime, dominate the cross-border union contacts that did not
change in nature until the end of the 1980s. Accordingly, we assume that
the shift to de facto monetary union stimulated bargaining coordination.
In consequence, cross-border union networking is predicted not to bring
about cross-border coordination of collective bargaining during the first
sub-period. The proposition that economic and monetary integration
translates into pattern bargaining may require further explanation. The
causal link between them is social learning (Teague, 2000). As outlined
above, economic integration creates a certain configuration of interests
that makes a cooperative solution possible provided the actors involved
realize that compromising makes all of them better off.
The third hypothesis implies that some kind of ‘beggar-your-
neighbour’ policy is inherent in cross-border coordination by pattern
bargaining. This raises the question: what is the difference between cross-
border pattern bargaining and purely competitive bargaining policies
that the former aims to contain? Statistically, this difference can be
captured by testing whether the scale of deviation of pay increases
between the smaller country and the larger reaches conventional levels of
statistical significance. Significantly negative deviations indicate compet-
itive bargaining; insignificantly negative deviations, in combination with
a significantly positive correlation between the wage movements of the
two countries, indicate cross-border coordination, with the smaller
country orienting its wage policy towards the larger one in a utilitarian,
self-interested way. In this case, undercutting by the smaller country
remains limited, while its wage increases are still significantly tied to the
wage settlements of the larger country.
Following Sisson and Marginson (2002: 199), we define coordination
as a mechanism ‘to achieve the same or related outcome in separate nego-
tiations’.1 Outcome is understood as the scale of increase in minimum
pay, as fixed by the collective agreements that are concluded by the coun-
tries’ principal unions, IGM and GMTN.2 This is because the EMF coor-
dination rule has also adopted the scale of pay increases as its reference
for pay policy. Changes in working time specified in the agreements are
taken into consideration, but other qualitative provisions are ignored. To
make the outcomes of agreements comparable with regard to different
length of validity, they were standardized on a yearly basis.
In addition, interviews with union representatives were conducted, focus-
ing on their view on the bargaining process. In accordance with our general
proposition that wage policy in the smaller country follows the larger
one, we concentrate here on the views of GMTN in order to identify the 
criteria that guided its bargaining strategy. A ‘wage formula’ in the strict
sense has never existed, since bargaining is seen as a political process that
requires equipping the bargainers with certain room for manoeuvre.
Nevertheless, traditional references for bargaining have been Austria’s
economic growth, overall productivity growth and inflation during the
last year, together with forecasts for the coming year. Hence the intro-
duction of the EMF coordination rule did not require GMTN to revise
its bargaining line. The unemployment rate is also considered in the
course of preparations for the bargaining round, as a factor affecting the
union’s bargaining power. A GMTN official conceded that special atten-
tion is paid to German developments because of its strong impact on
Austria. Nevertheless, any explicit orientation of GMTN towards the
outcome of the bargaining rounds in Germany was denied.
Figure 1 presents the difference in gross wage increases between
Austria and Germany over the entire time period. The direction of bar-
gaining results for the two countries has converged since the early 1980s,
and the scale of results has done so especially from the mid-1990s
onwards. In addition, Austrian pay increases exceeded those in Germany
more often than the reverse.
To test rigorously whether and how Austrian bargaining interacts with
the German bargaining outcomes, we employ a multivariate analysis. In
line with the GMTN bargaining criteria indicated above, growth of GDP
(Y), productivity growth (Q), inflation (P) and changes in the unem-
ployment rate (U) enter the model as control variables, when estimat-
ing the impact of German wage movements in the metal industry
(Wm,BRD) on the Austrian ones (Wm,AUT). It is impossible to include both
past and forecast values of the economic variables because of multi-
collinearity problems. Therefore we use the actual values of the year dur-
ing which the bargaining round in Austria occurred as a proxy. Put in
standard linear fashion, these specifications yield the following regres-
sion model, designed to test the first and second hypotheses.3
Wm, AUT  0  1U  2P  3Q  4Y  5Wm,BRD  
The results for this model are reported in Table 2. As regards the period
before monetary union, none of the explanatory variables, including
the German collective agreements, has a significant impact on Austrian
bargaining outcomes.4 This supports our first hypothesis that collective
bargaining in Austria did not systematically interact with German bar-
gaining before the two countries formed a de facto monetary union.
Thereafter, the results show that Austrian gross wage increases signifi-
cantly parallel the German. Hence, monetary union has given rise to
cross-border coordination.
While our first two hypotheses deal with the question whether the
Austrian bargaining rounds systematically relate to the German ones at
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all, the third hypothesis refers to how they do so. The related measure is
the scale of difference in standardized bargaining outcomes between the
two countries. The t-test for comparing means from distinct samples can
be employed for examining whether the period-specific average pay
increases in Austria significantly differ from the German. Since we found
a coordination effect only for the time of monetary union, we could con-
fine our analysis to this period. To give a complete overview of the wage
movements, however, we also include the time before monetary union.
Table 3 documents the differences in wage increases, averaged over selected
periods of time. For any of these periods, the difference is positive from
the perspective of the Austrian unions. For 1980/1981 to 2002/2003, the
period central to our third hypothesis, Austrian wage increases were
higher than German by 1.28 percentage points on average. With p  0.001,
this difference is even statistically significant. These findings run counter to
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FIGURE 1. The Difference between Austrian and German Bargaining
Outcomes
our third hypothesis, which assumes that cross-border bargaining coordi-
nation implies the ‘exploitation of the great by the small’. In contrast
to what collective action theory implies, national unions do not neces-
sarily adopt a utilitarian, self-interested policy line when it comes to relat-
ing their own bargaining strategy to the development in neighbouring
countries. In the case of Austria’s relationship to Germany, the positive
deviation can be traced to a corresponding difference in economic devel-
opment. Table 3 also compares the two countries in terms of differences
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TABLE 2. Regression on Wage Increases in the Austrian Metal Industry
Dependent variable:Wm,AUT Period
Variable 1969/70–1979/80 1980/1–2002/03
C 25.42932 0.580083
(25.52396) (1.188636)
U 60.39168 0.267549
(59.55990) (1.004959)
P 1895.825 55.05484
(963.0655) (53.30336)
Q 7.398468 0.716948
(8.236460) (0.491583)
Y 4.534257 1.505606**
(4.551188) (0.634136)
Wm,BRD 16.82213 0.429783**
(8.189932) (0.181288)
R-squared 0.830740 0.757105
Adjusted R-squared 0.015560 0.681200
N 7 22
F-test (Prob.) 0.640859 0.000178
F-statistic 0.981615 9.974419
Notes: ***   	 0.01, **   	 0.05, *   	 0.1.
W m,AUT Gross wage increase negotiated by GMTN (or predecessor), stand-
ardized on a yearly basis. Data source: GMTN
 Parameter
Pt Inflation rate. Data source: OECD 2004 Leading Indicators, 2004.
U Change in unemployment rate. Datasource: OECD Economic Outlook,
2004.
Q Overall productivity growth. Datasource: OECD Economic Outlook,
2004.
Y Growth of GDP (current values). Data source: OECD National
Accounts 1, 2004.
Wm,BRD Gross wage increase negotiated by IGM during the bargaining round
preceding the bargaining round in Austria, standardized on a yearly
basis. Data source: WSI Tarifarchiv.
 Error term
in economic growth, productivity growth and unemployment. Over all
periods considered, Austria performed better with regard to all three indi-
cators, and the performance differentials widened with the exception of
GDP growth. Therefore the Austrian union found more leeway for wage
increases than the German.
Conclusions and Broader European Implications
The above analysis has shown that a strictly decentralized approach to
cross-border coordination, based on pattern bargaining, can work as an
effective means of containing competitive bargaining. Moreover, the
coordination potential of this approach is even higher than the analytical
considerations of this article suggest. In contrast to our initial assump-
tion, the pattern-setting union of the large country is not necessarily
compelled to ‘pay’ for cooperation by their counterparts in small coun-
tries by conceding them somewhat lower wage increases. The constituent
property of this kind of coordination is its very special interplay of eco-
nomic conditions and coordination strategies. In this respect, the crucial
finding is that wage bargaining in Austria became coordinated with
German bargaining in parallel with Austria’s shift to de facto monetary
union with Germany, while this shift was not reflected by intensified
explicit coordination initiatives. In contrast to this, the coordination net-
work of Austria, Germany and Switzerland (DACH) that existed at the
time of this double move from monetary autonomy to monetary union
and from uncoordinated to coordinated bargaining across the two coun-
tries had been established long before these changes, and remained
unchanged as the sole cross-border network long afterwards.
It follows that economic conditions rather than transnational net-
works and intentional action constituted the driving force behind the rise
of coordination. This can also be seen from the actors’ perception of the
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TABLE 3. Differences in Wage Increases and Economic Performancea
Period Wage Unemployment Productivity GDP 
increasesb rate growth growth
1969/70–2002/03c 1.16 (1.64) 1.54 0.88 0.45
1969/70–1979/80c 0.84 (0.34) 0.08 0.26 0.88
1980/81–2002/03c 1.28 (3.71)*** 2.19 1.07 0.30
aAustrian minus German values (difference in percentage points).
bStandardized increases in gross wages.
cData on economic performance refer to calendar years.
*** p 	 0.01; t-tests for paired samples; t-values in parentheses.
process. As noted, one of our GMTN respondents said that the union
does not orient its policy towards the German agreements. This is
because they are argued to be usually less favourable to the employees
than the Austrian agreements. This statement is confirmed by our find-
ings on the differences in gross wage increases. However, a statistically
significant interaction of Austrian with German bargaining outcomes
is also apparent. One can infer from this that the Austro-German case
of cross-border coordination rests on latent rather than manifest processes.
It is economic interdependence, crystallized in monetary union, which
performs a latent function of bargaining coordination. Hence, European
economic integration is not merely a challenge to collective bargaining.
In addition to stimulating cross-border coordination initiatives, it is
a force that also contributes to their coordination effectiveness.
Geographically, cross-border coordination activities are most developed
among the countries recording a long period of monetary union with
Germany, originating in the former ‘DM zone’ (Marginson and Schulten,
1999; Marginson and Sisson, 2004).
This brings us to the implications of our findings for the European
level. There are two issues: first, the generalizability of the above findings,
and second, the special contribution of cross-border pattern bargaining to
EU-level coordination. Although the bargaining systems of Austria and
Germany differ in several respects which are seen as notable obstacles to
cross-border coordination (asynchronous timing of the bargaining
rounds and manifold differences in the scope of the agreements), they also
show strong similarities, namely multi-employer bargaining and more or
less the same reference criteria for negotiations. These similarities may
cast doubt on whether cross-border pattern bargaining can work in the
case of countries which are more disparate.
This question has become all the more important, since the incoher-
ence of the national bargaining systems has drastically increased within
the EU since enlargement in 2004 (Marginson and Traxler, 2005): multi-
employer bargaining is lacking in the majority of new member states.
As numerous analytical studies show (Soskice and Iversen, 2000; Traxler
et al., 2001), the responsiveness of wage policy to monetary policy
varies with the institutional properties of the bargaining system. These
variations may go hand in hand with differing ability to participate in
transnational coordination activities, although these studies are not
directly applicable to the problem of sector-level coordination, as they all
focus on national bargaining systems as a whole and their capacity for
economy-wide coordination.
On balance, one cannot rule out the possibility of participation in cross-
border sector-level pattern bargaining even when the bargaining system is
not supportive. This is because pattern bargaining is a rather robust coor-
dination mechanism which draws its effectiveness from economic forces
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rather than from a special institutional set up, as we have seen earlier. For
instance, UK experience shows that intra-industry coordination by pattern
setting can emerge even under single-employer bargaining (Marginson and
Traxler, 2005). This is because relatively high intra-industry degrees of sub-
stitutability of products and homogeneity of production propel processes
of imitation and benchmarking which can be converted into pattern bar-
gaining if there are unionized leading companies whose single-employer
settlements set a going rate for the sector.5 Along with certain other sectors,
the metal industry meets these minimum preconditions for participation in
cross-border pattern bargaining in almost all countries. Minimum precon-
ditions, however, probably enable a country only to play the passive role
of a ‘patterntaker’. There is good reason to assume that only multi-
employer agreements empower national bargainers to set a cross-border
pattern, because only this kind of agreement can visibly and credibly
reduce uncertainty about what the going rate is.
We turn now to the relationship of cross-border pattern bargaining to
EU-level coordination processes. Given decentralized coordination as the
only realistic option at this level, there are three possible mechanisms
(Sisson and Marginson, 2002: 214): ‘synchronized bargaining’, where the
coordination effect comes from simultaneous negotiations in the distinct
countries; ‘target setting’, in which the national bargainers each follow an
agreed coordination rule in their separate negotiations; and pattern bar-
gaining in the above sense. Although a synchronization of national bar-
gaining rounds is under discussion by the ETUC (Dufresne and Mermet,
2002), this is not a feasible option for the foreseeable future. As noted
above, the timing of bargaining has even diverged in the long run in the
Austro-German case. The fact that cross-border coordination in Austria
and Germany has evolved and consolidated despite this divergence also
indicates that synchronization is not an essential ingredient for such coor-
dination. In contrast to this, target setting, formalized in coordination
rules and common standards, has formally developed into the core mech-
anism of EU-wide union-led coordination efforts (Marginson and Sisson,
2004). Because these targets are non-binding, however, they can hardly be
effective without being buttressed by pattern-setting machinery. Large
countries in which the overall process can obtain an anchor are at the heart
of cross-border pattern bargaining. Hence, the direction of coordination
depends on bargaining outcomes in the large countries. If they take
account of the need to combat downward pressures on standards, then
they become vulnerable to free riding strategies in the smaller countries.
This cooperation problem makes EU-wide target setting important. Its
main task is to stabilize expectations and generate mutual trust, such that
the pattern-setting effect of economic interdependence can work for the
sake of containing competitive bargaining strategies. Put more specifically,
this means keeping the bargainers in large ‘anchor’ countries in line with
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the agreed bargaining principles and assuring that their counterparts in
smaller countries do not deviate negatively from them too much. At EU
level, target-setting and pattern bargaining are thus complementary, inter-
related mechanisms. The former can be seen as the ‘software’ of cross-
border coordination, and the latter as its ‘hardware’.
On an EU-wide scale, it is easier to find conforming followers than
pattern-setters capable of consistently observing the common principles.
This is for two reasons. It is not very hard for the small countries to fol-
low, since they usually perform better in economic terms than their large
neighbours. The effectiveness of the overall process hinges on the pattern-
setters. While it is rational for the bargainers of the large high-wage coun-
tries to take on this role, their capacity to do so is critical. The capacity to
guide bargaining in Europe in accordance with EU-level coordination
principles is tied to a powerful system of multi-employer bargaining,
which is not standard in the very large European economies enjoying re-
latively high pay levels. Single-employer bargaining prevails in the UK.
In Italy and France, multi-employer bargaining is not well prepared to
deliver outcomes that continuously exceed the inflation rate. This leaves
Germany which is commonly seen as the primary candidate for a
European pattern-setter. However, two recent developments have made
this prospect doubtful. One is enlargement and the divide between the
eurozone and the rest of Europe. Even though pattern bargaining appears
to require rather limited coverage (Traxler et al., 2001), one may doubt
that the German pattern suffices to unleash a European-wide effect.
Second, accelerating bargaining decentralization threatens to hollow out
multi-employer bargaining. As is the case of other sectors in Germany,
multi-employer agreements in the metal industry have introduced various
opening clauses that authorize management and works councils to under-
cut the standard rate, not only in cases of ‘hardship’, but also if this proves
necessary to achieve sustainable levels of employment (Dribbusch, 2004).6
The upshot of these considerations is that in response to growing
economic integration, cross-border pattern bargaining, comprising a large
country and neighbouring smaller ones, is likely either to work already or
to come to work in inter-regional areas. The scope of these distinct areas
will probably reflect similarities in levels of wages and productivity
(Ulman, 1975). More uncertain, however, is whether EU-level union ini-
tiatives are able to govern ‘bottom-up’ coordination by pattern bargain-
ing in a way that contains competitive bargaining across Europe.
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NOTES
1 There is a debate whether pattern bargaining should be conceptualized as a
process or an outcome (Capelli, 1990; Ready, 1990). In accordance with our
definition of coordination, our notion of pattern bargaining includes both
dimensions, since we want to examine whether intentional and unintention-
al processes (i.e. union coordination activities and EMU) result in effective
coordination in terms of outcomes.
2 For Germany, we take the collective agreement for Nordwürttemberg-
Nordbaden, which is usually the pilot agreement for the sector. In Austria
the wage agreements for the metal industry cover increases in both mini-
mum wages and actual pay. We disregard here the clauses on actual pay,
since there is no counterpart in Germany.
3 We assume a linear relationship between unemployment and wages.
However, we also tested the nonlinear relationship (Phillips, 1958) by
using the reciprocal and squared value of unemployment. This non-linear
specification did not change the results, underscoring the robustness of
the model. Inspection of the regressors showed no serious problems of
multicollinearity. Another statistical problem is that regressing wages on
such economic variables as current inflation may create an endogeneity
problem, even though the bargainers orient their policy also on forecasts, as
noted above. Since it is hard to find instrumental variables in our case, we
omitted the economic variables, such that Wm, BRD remained as the only
regressor. Related results did not differ from those of the model in Table 2.
4 In the case of the economic variables, one may find this lack of explanatory
power amazing. This finding indicates that political factors, such as union
power and package deals within the framework of corporatist incomes
policies, dominated merely economic orientations. These factors are hard to
measure and are not central to our research question.
5 In this respect, inter-industry coordination by pattern bargaining is more
demanding, because it has to work with less supportive spill-over effects
across companies.
6 For this reason, the EMF review, designating Germany as the only country
that fully met the coordination rule in 2004 and 2005, should be taken with
a grain of salt.
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